Porti franchi e zes: della mitologia e dei rischi di utilizzo improprio di una categoria di istituti vagamente definita e camaleontica

Abstract

Most of the abundant literature on special economic zones (SEZs) insists on touting the potential of the instrument and on considering all types of SEZs as a model of successful public intervention. An aspect little investigated - and so far the subject of little study - concerns, however, the juridical nature of the institutions and their usual correlation, not by chance found since the most ancient times (reported since the seventeenth century AD, but dating back very probably to more ancient times), with the performance of numerous illicit activities and crimes, such as smuggling and tax evasion. This correlation effectively transforms the ZES into a tempting business opportunity for criminal and terrorist organizations, making their introduction inadvisable, without an adequate system of controls aimed at preventing criminal infiltration.

With this article we intend to analyze the aforementioned aspects in more detail, illustrating the juridical mechanisms through which a certain type of SEZ, the free port, has adapted to certain legislative dynamics (such as the evolution of the international law to combat fraud and tax evasion) and market (e.g., the demand for safe-haven assets and high-level asset management/advisory services), and has gradually transformed into a new form of tax haven (or, if you prefer, of offshore companies) capable of transforming wealth, or making it invisible, to meet the needs of the richest and of criminal and terrorist organizations.