Abstract
The considerations carried out in this work arise from a specific scenario that generates doubts about the applicability of administrative automation in discretionary activity, and focuses on a specific question: to what extent the public administration, once it has decided to adopt artificial intelligence tools for the management of a specific procedure, can deviate from the output produced by such tools. Basic question that underlies a plurality of issues that refer to classic institutions of administrative law, but also recently formulated principles. Among the traditional concepts we find the notion of discretion and that of self-limit; with reference, however, to the most current theories, we highlight the principle of algorithmic legality, in the particular declination of the principle of non-exclusivity of algorithmic decisions and the role of the human being in automated administrative procedures.
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PDFRiferimenti bibliografici
I contenuti redazionali di questo sito sono distribuiti con una licenza Creative Commons, Attribuzione - Condividi allo stesso modo 3.0 Italia (CC BY-SA 3.0 IT) eccetto dove diversamente specificato. Diretta da G. Terracciano, G. Mazzei, J. Espartero Casado. Direttore Responsabile: G. Caputi. Redazione: C. Rizzo. Iscritta al N. 16/2009 del Reg. stampa del Tribunale di Roma - ISSN 2036-7821
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